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ABSTRACT

The environment in which banks and other financial services industry firms operate was
once very stable. It is now increasingly permeated with change. Enhanced performance demands
make this change salient to high-level decision-makers. Many of the opportunities firms now face
are path-dependent and this will continue to be so. For firms to make effective choices in such an
environment, both competitive strategy and the strategy-making process must come to terms with
opportunities which evolve over time. Old decision-making systems and attitudes are unhelpful
in this and may even be impediments to good outcomes.
Risk inevitably features in getting these decisions right. All strategic decisions induce and
impose constraints on the types of risk banks traditionally monitor and manage. This needs to be
explicitly considered and is generally not. Strategic decisions also impose a new type of risk,
detailed here, which also needs to be analyzed, monitored, and controlled. All these activities
require changes, discussed in detail, both in decision-making protocols and in the organizational
structures and routines supporting decision-making.
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1. The Changing Financial Environment
Bankers have cause for concern as they contemplate the future of their businesses. The
landscape of the financial services industry is changing dramatically. The change is often not
slow. Historic franchises are under attack or seem strikingly less secure. The environments in
which profits have been made and results delivered to shareholders are evolving in unfamiliar and
uncertain ways. A guide for understanding and action would be useful.
Change in the competitive landscape is the most overt element of this. Consolidation in
the banking sector is creating significantly larger institutions expanding well beyond their historic
geographic locations and, increasingly, beyond national boundaries. At the same time,
competitive strategies are converging as the traditional walls separating banking, insurance, and
investments are blurring. Through acquisitions, mergers, alliances and de novo initiatives, banks
are extending the breadth of financial service product offerings to both commercial and individual
customers. The pace of change is increasing and, in particular, the speed with which once
distinctive product offerings and services are being copied and offered by competitors is up.
Banks which wish to survive must respond.
The consolidation is no minor matter. The North Carolina National Bank was once the
name notwithstanding - a typical American local banking company, operating in a state far from
the manufacturing and financial centers. Under ambitious, hard-driving, and risk-taking
leadership, it transformed into Nationsbank, a major player in a thriving region, and then again,
through merger turned into acquisition, into a truly national Bank of America. BancOne
routinized the process of growth through acquisition. It too grew to national significance in
America, in large part through developing extraordinary speed and efficiency in exporting its
systems and procedures to new acquisitions. The phenomenon is hardly confined to America,
large though its market may be. The former Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation is now
headquartered in London and is truly global in the scope of its operations and subsidiaries. These
changes offer economies of scale and the many advantages of a broader network. These are
potentially quite serious competitive considerations.
The convergence is in some respects even more striking. Firms which were large and
powerful but seemed at least to have a distinct identity are increasingly moving into all lines of
business or at least seriously contemplating such a move. It has been many years since the New
York banks merged and grew into the Citibank, complex and multinational enough to have had
the troubles it did in the 1970s. However, Citibank was still a bank. The merger with Travelers
gave Citi a tremendous interest in insurance and brought many Travelers executives into high
positions in the new company’s management. The melding with Salomon Smith Barney clearly
changed the organization, even if certain traditional Salomon lines of business were closed down
and certain aspects of the Salomon culture were moderated. ING began in insurance but is now a
global financial institution with many lines of business. It operates banks. It has a major asset
management business. It is a force in investment banking. Convergence appears, at the moment,
as a bet on the prospective value of cross-selling and economies of scope in certain operations. If
the bet pays off, the firms that put their money down will be formidable competitors.
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Commodification attacks, and seems to threaten the decline, of many historic franchises.
Many lines of business which were once driven by long-standing relationships or were otherwise
a matter of custom-tailored products are increasingly transaction-oriented and up for bid.
Investment banking services are the outstanding example of this – the period in which a
company’s investment banker was a part of its corporate identity now seems lost in the mists of
time – but they are far from the only, or even the most thought-provoking, example today.
Derivative securities were once essentially contracts crafted on an ad hoc basis. Now one reads of
conversations in which one banker tells another “You were winning too much business. We were
sure you either had a new model we didn’t yet understand or were headed for big trouble.” Lines
of business which were once thought to be information - (and history-) intensive, like small
business credit analysis, are becoming systematized and much more open to competition. The
most intriguing variant of this appears in vivid relief in the mortgage market. Once there was no
mortgage market, of course, except in retail; but there is increasingly radical disintegration
upstream now. In all of these examples, efficiency considerations are coming to the fore and the
informational asymmetries which once sheltered the banker’s life are becoming smaller and
smaller. These developments have broader ramifications, not just for the level of profits earned
but equally for the perception of product lines and the business units in which activities ought to
be grouped together within and across firms.
These examples are phenomena and not causes: they are pictures of a present rather than
any real guide to thinking about the future. But their upshot is clear. Competition is getting
tougher. Small responses and tactics involving incremental changes seem unlikely to help. While
the force of prospective competitive challenges is unambiguous, their form is obscure. The
evolving competitive landscape is a threatening place.
These changes, and whatever lies behind them, are given enhanced significance by change
in the corporate control landscape. Once this landscape was flat and essentially featureless, but it
increasingly looks like Iceland – apparently covered by ancient glaciers worn to smoothness but
in fact covered with established and scaldingly hot geysers and including many regions in which
geysers threaten to break through. Shareholders are now far more conscious of performance
standards than they were. They are aware management has more opportunity than it once did to
affect financial performance. And shareholders are increasingly active. Management which fails
to take the challenges seriously will be far more vulnerable now than it once was. The recent
changes at the CEO level of Bank One and First Union Corp. are seen by many observers as
testimonial to the performance demands of shareholders and the markets.
Institutional shareholders are more sophisticated and more driven by their own
performance needs than they once were. This has had consequences far beyond shareholder
motions in annual meetings and formal interviews. Analysts now feel the need to provide much
finer detail on where firms’ profits come from and how great those profits are. Analysts seek, in
ways which generate real pressures, more transparent accounting conventions. They want line-ofbusiness reporting of results. They want to see, and discuss, rates-of-return by businesses. All of
this renders far more visible management’s ability to cope with, and foresee, the changing
environment.
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Shareholders know that management can do more than it once could. In Europe, selective
credit controls have been on the decline for many years. The European Union Second Banking
Directive shattered legal constraints on cross-border innovation there. London’s financial market
had been in some respects closed and uncompetitive, and the Big Bang of the early 1980s
changed that world utterly. The situation in Japan is more constrained, but the 1985 elimination
of the Temporary Interest Rate Act (of 1945!) had a first-order impact on competition and the
Tokyo Big Bang opened the securities markets in a similarly major way. In America, the waning
of Glass-Steagell and other regulatory developments are also opening up new possibilities in very
public ways.
Sensitivity to these developments is a matter of increasing urgency for senior
management. Events now sometimes come to a sharp point. In the most recent Commerzbank
annual meeting, a significant shareholder spoke at length about a vision of the future alternative to
that of incumbent management; and while management responded heatedly that he had agreed not
to do this, the thirty percent negative vote which he mustered against a minor resolution later in
the meeting was a clear warning shot across management’s bows. Allianz has made plain that it
is prepared to sell its holdings in firms, however prominent, offering an inadequate rate of return
on its investments. Actual corporate control transactions do now take place. In the days of
strictly state-by-state banking, Wells Fargo was once a premier player in one of the very largest
American markets. It was essentially purchased by a large and well-run bank from the upper
Midwest. U.S. Trust, long a well-respected name in private banking was purchased by Charles
Schwab in part because of slow growth and the acquirer’s vision of the true national potential of
the brand name.
The development of new technologies and the lowering of regulatory barriers suggest that
shifts in corporate control will not be just limited to changes within the financial service industry
but extend well beyond traditional players. The continued extension of features in Intuit’s
Quicken software and other web driven vehicles move these firms closer and closer to bank
functionality. Internet start-ups like eCharge and Flooz.com are developing alternative payment
vehicles which may lead to the development of new service capabilities ultimately creating new
models for financial service firms.
Expectations of management are thus increasingly high. Monitoring is increasingly good
and the knowledge of alternatives – both actions and investments – is increasingly sophisticated.
All this points to enhanced vulnerability of incumbent management which does not take the future
seriously; however the present is working out. Understanding the evolving competitive future has
never been more important.
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These dynamics, while building for some time, have greatly increased pace in the past
several years. This trend is expected to continue. Banks are increasingly making the investments
and commitments to be multi-product and multi-national financial service firms and to offer new
innovation to their customers. The structures and organizations to support this are largely
untested, and it remains to be seen how the various operating strategies now being employed will
play out. As we will explain below, the result of this is a new set of risk issues. These go far
beyond bankers’ traditional concerns with financial risk and the risk that functional operations
such as clearing may go awry, reaching to questions of the risk involved in committing company
resources to particular business activities. The quality of the management of these issues will
differentiate winners from losers and define long-term success in the industry.
The research presented here provides a structure for better understanding the new
dimensions of risk. The ultimate strategic issue in banking today is how to invest in unique
talents and capabilities to generate sustainable attractive returns in a rapidly evolving and
therefore challenging world. The ideas we offer will be helpful to bankers in their ongoing search
for long-term competitive success.
Our basic approach can be summarized briefly. The environment of change needs to be
treated as if it is here to stay. This means that the economic logic of profitability remains as it
was but the conditions of its application are now, and may well remain, far different from what
they were. Most business decisions important enough to occupy the attention of senior decisionmakers will involve sunk costs and thus the danger of loss. There is no avoiding the choices: the
purchase price of investments already proven wise will later be too high and the opportunity cost
of buying late will be too great. To thrive in the world bankers now face, their institutions require
philosophy, organization, and systems to accept and exploit change rather than be overwhelmed
by it. In the chapters which follow, we develop these ideas and their implications systematically
and offer detailed suggestions as to what to do.
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2. Strategy and Context
In an environment of change, operational efficiency is clearly not enough to assure
profitability. Insightful strategy is essential. When banking was a more stable business, effective
strategy was well understood. The old times are gone and the old approaches do not suit the new
circumstances. It is easiest to understand why this is so with a more powerful conceptual
framework encompassing both the old and the new and enabling managers to situate their
businesses and draw inferences. We develop such a framework below. It makes plain why the
new differs from the old and what precisely needs to be changed for firms to adapt.
A conceptual framework needs foundations. These must begin with the context and
objectives of the firm. The firms we are considering here are banks. They provide banking and
perhaps related services to retail, institutional, and wholesale customers based or operating in one
or perhaps many countries. Some of the bank’s activities thus take place in its own home country,
some in international centers such as London, New York, and Tokyo, some in regional or national
centers, and some local to customers, offshore, or in any location where back-office operations
can efficiently be sited. The banks engage, qua banks, in the usual range of intermediary
activities, fee-based services, and trading. The purpose of all this, of course, is to make a profit.
There is always an upper bound to the profit that can be made from such services. Often
there are other banks or competing financial services firms which are already able to provide the
services or would, for a sufficiently high price, set up to provide them. Often the basic ideas
behind the services are well known or at least understood. Even when a bank develops a new
product, the innovation is usually copied, often relatively quickly (compared, say, to the life of a
patent). Monopoly on the innovation would therefore be relatively temporary. In these ways,
competition is often an important constraint on profitability in banking. Operating efficiency and
other such tactics are no solution to challenges from similarly situated firms. Ordinary profits –
the baseline “normal profits” in an industry referred to in basic economic theory – are the
outcome when competition is vigorous.
What banks seek from their operations, then, are extraordinary profits, and not just
occasionally but rather on a sustainable basis. This represents success. What achieving it
requires is some unique talent or capability which serves as an impediment to the usual leveling
forces of imitation and competition. The important medium to long-term question in banking is
therefore how to create combinations of bank resources, services, and clients which will generate
such unique talents and capabilities. We call such questions strategic. More precisely, we will
use the word strategic to describe firm-level decisions which result in such asymmetries and
which are difficult or very costly subsequently to implement (or to reverse in the short-run) and so
tend to have long-lasting consequences for firms’ fortunes. These are important in any
environment in which it is possible to create such an asymmetric and advantageous position.
They are particularly important in a dynamic environment. The real threat to firms in changing
environments, as reported by one senior banking executive, lies precisely in losing sight of the
strategic issues when the natural tendency of management is to focus on the most urgent
operational demands.
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In the earlier, less turbulent, environments, there were straightforward and relatively
durable answers to the strategy question. The theme was the creation of barriers to direct
competition (or the exploitation of extant barriers), and there is abundant and vivid evidence that
this was often feasible. Examples of the banking sector’s ability to sustain competitive advantage
include: J.P. Morgan’s corporate banking franchise, Citi’s retail distribution capacity, and Bank
of New York’s processing capability. However, the basic approach had weaknesses and
vulnerabilities which have become painfully obvious.
Bankers conceived of their strategies in terms of a client-arena-product matrix. The goal
was to offer a distinctive mixture to avoid direct competition. The general approach was thus
one of positioning. In a relatively static environment, this was a viable way of organizing
systematic thought, since the possibilities were not changing. But what ultimately protected the
positions? The answer comes back to barriers to entry. There were six of any practical
significance.
For many years, the most quantitatively important category was probably locational
barriers. Sometimes this was actually a matter of a limited number of attractive physical sites in a
particular population or business center. More often it was a matter of being inside regulatory
barriers, allowed to operate and being on the list of institutions whose continuity the authorities
wanted to preserve. One particularly concrete example of the value of being inside of regulatory
boundaries involved the longtime American ban on interstate branching. All large American
banks were then (and therefore) headquartered in New York, California, or Illinois. Areas of
lucrative opportunity such as Florida or Texas had their bank’s franchise protected by restrictive
entry legislation.
Reputation can also form a barrier to entry. Reputations can only be formed around
activities which are difficult to do. They are also typically formed over an extended period of
time. Thus they are not subject to prompt imitation. A reputation for competence and probity is
the foundation of relationship management. Competence and probity have served banks well in
the area of private banking, surety and large scale corporate lending. It is no wonder that
Northern Trust or U.S. Trust protected and burnished their brand names, or J.P. Morgan and
Chase portrayed themselves with such conservative images. Reputations mattered and formed a
viable barrier to entry.
Complex and capital-intensive businesses often provide their own natural scale-based
barriers to entry. The minimum efficient scale can be large relative to the potential market. In
custody and processing, for example, the investment requirements for capital and network
building, may well be so large that only a limited number of competitors can realistically hope to
be successful even globally. The example of State Street Bank comes to mind. A rather typical
commercial banking firm twenty years ago, it systematically invested (and re-invested proceeds
from exited businesses) in a securities custody infrastructure to the point today that the firm is
hardly a bank in the traditional sense but one of a select group of large scale global custodians.
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Access to and efficient management of information can form a barrier to entry for similar
reasons. For example, large-scale samples of patterns of consumer behavior may enable a bank to
perform or price its services much more efficiently or to offer its services to a set of customers at
a better price than would be possible without the sample. The early success of the mono-line
credit card companies such as MBNA and First USA provided vivid examples of how customer
“data mining” and other information technologies can create competitive advantage and
substantial shareholder value.
Relationship lock-in costs may form a barrier to entry as well. In corporate banking, and
to a certain extent in the upper end of consumer banking, the ability to tie customers to one’s
operating systems and thus increase the cost of moving, may lead to more sustainable, long-term
profit. It was this logic that led firms like Mellon and Chase to invest so heavily in cash
management services to secure corporate clients and their long-term customer relationships. It is
worth noting, however, that the more the transaction is commoditized, the less this is a profitable
strategy.
Finally, economies of scope can also form barriers. Firms with a broad enough business
might have cost advantages which entrants and other incumbents do not. These economies could
exist for some particular set of customers or of product offerings. They could equally well be
economies to the banking firm as a whole.
It is readily apparent that these barriers did create profits. The big California banks were
quite profitable, free from competition from major banks elsewhere in the country. (The more
recent change in fortunes of major California and Illinois banks, on the other hand, is an equally
vivid illustration of how such constraints occasionally can collapse.) As the demographic profile
of the state of Florida began to shift, banks with a local franchise like Barnett commanded a
substantial premium when they went on the block. One reason behind the historic profitability of
Wall Street investment banks was the reluctance of clients to switch providers.
Nonetheless, the positioning approach had major potential defects. Being fundamentally a
list of circumstances rather than a theory of how competition could be short-circuited, it was not
easy generalized. Also it offered no internal call for generalization, for the world it depicted was
a static one.
To provide a more general and robust theory, we cannot proceed from an assumption of
static environments. That this was the world for many years was a happy state but a confusing
precedent. Against the background of this Old World of static equilibrium we must see a New
World of change. There are two importantly different cases worth distinguishing. One is
punctuated equilibrium, the other continuous change.
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To understand the features and implications of the new environments, it is helpful first to
lay out carefully what the old one was actually like. Outside the entry barriers of good position,
competition was fierce and profits driven down. The barriers were like the walls of a castle, and
inside tranquility and profits reigned. Given that the firms in question generally ran many
activities, it is reasonable to ask how the decision-making should be structured in such an
environment. The answer is feudally, with barons and domains. How were the choices actually
decided? In a basically static environment, it made sense to assess activities and the prospects for
new proposals via detailed cost and revenue projections far into the future, performing discounted
cash flow analysis. (This is the native terrain of what used to be called strategic planning.) If those
performing these analyses got it wrong, what were the consequences? Merely normal profits in
the activity in question. Otherwise secure activities and profit streams were not endangered.
Imagine instead a slightly less stable world. In particular, imagine an intermittently less
stable world. Periods of sustained stasis are interrupted – punctuated – by dramatic structural
change. This change is structural in the sense that it redefines who the competitors are and which
positions are defensible. The emerging market debt crisis in the mid eighties is one example of a
stasis interrupted by a dramatic structural change. For many banks the heavy cost of loan losses
in that arena drove them from the internal markets completely. Other institutions, such as
CoreStates (now a part of First Union) had to re-structure their infrastructure to build new and
different businesses in international money movement and documentary collection rather than
lending. As in the example of international banking new, theretofore unimagined, positions may
emerge. So new opportunities arise and old opportunities disappear. It is immediately apparent
that in such a setting, the old means of project assessment are inadequate. Even viewed from
within a period of stasis, future cost and revenue streams cannot be imagined to go on
unperturbed forever. They must be assessed in a way which incorporates the possibility that their
attractiveness may abruptly get much better or much worse. The former is the interesting
possibility: it may be worth investing in projects which in some possible state-of-the-world will
be well worth owning. The worst that can happen is an out-of-the-money option. One tries again.
The more extreme case is continuous change. Change is never literally continuous, of
course; and perhaps this possibility is best thought of as a series of very frequently punctuated
equilibria, with swiftly evolving opportunities and repeated radical reconfigurations of resources.
It is very likely in such a world that future decisions are constrained by past ones. Decisionmaking on individual projects would be as before, since nothing structural to the logic of
valuation has changed; but it would be desirable to change something else. Since the periods of
stasis are short and opportunities often path-dependent, it is important that the organization
generate a steady flow of new projects and be set up in a way to nurture them, since the costs of
being wrong are now far worse that in the punctuated equilibrium case. The threat is not merely
one bet not paying off but rather rapid obsolescence. The rationale for Chase Manhattan and
other large banks investing in portfolios of new technology companies is in part motivated by
financial return on the investment but equally driven by the option value inherent in gaining early
access to the new technologies being developed.
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It is clear that the character of our own times has become one of punctuated equilibrium or
continuous change rather than of essentially static equilibrium. There are some exceptions, but in
general the duration of monopoly positions is shrinking rapidly. We are in a period in which
technical change may reconfigure much, much more. This process will clearly continue for some
time to come. These claims are even more obvious when considered by lines of business. We
group them below, for convenience, as retail banking, private banking, insurance, corporate
banking, and securities sales and services.
A series of examples in retail banking exhibit a consistent theme. American banks once
paid no interest on consumer checking accounts. Accounts paying interest following the returns
on money market instruments represented a major change. Cash Management Accounts which
enabled brokerage customers many of the services of a checking account and more, broadened the
scope of change. Direct mail marketing fundamentally redefined the cachement areas for
customers for many services. Banks headquartered in low-tax New Hampshire offering no walkin services whatsoever have for many years advertised, offering superior rates and charges to mail
and, latterly, electronic customers, in the Wall Street Journal. Sophisticated direct mailing
strategies employed by the credit card industry provided national distribution for firms operating
in locales such as Delaware or North Dakota, far from population centers. Automatic Teller
Machines initially radically redefined what retail branches should be; and as ATM networks
grew, they made branch and corporate location itself increasingly insignificant. Internet banking
threatens to make this shift complete. Attempts at cross-selling have been going on for years.
The results continue unimpressively. The theme is that the significance of locational and
regulatory barriers and of relationship lock-in is declining. The dramatic failure of Sears in the
1980s to build a “financial supermarket” around Dean Witter, Allstate and the Discover card has
been repeated on a smaller scale throughout the U.S. banking system. Despite tremendous
efforts, banks have been unsuccessful in their attempts to capture significant shares of consumer
financial wallets.
In private banking, increasingly well-informed clients are putting pressure on results.
There is a war for talent for private bankers. New venues for privacy have emerged, and the
protections of the old ones are not what they were. The theme here is that the significance of
location, reputation, and lock-in is, again, declining. Long the home of global private banking,
Switzerland and its banks have seen their status erode as sophisticated bankers and investment
managers from London, New York and elsewhere have attacked these markets. Data suggests
that newer players such as Charles Schwab and Fidelity Investments are attracting increasing
shares of high net worth client dollars to their efficient, self-directed business models.
The insurance industry is particularly sensitive to the changes in information processing
and analysis technologies. The rate of new product innovation has been brisk. The ability
provided by the Internet for shopping and precise comparison has been a major shock to the
distribution channels. Location (here, predominantly important because of licensing requirements
and regulation) is still important but reputation, information access, and relationships are
increasingly unimportant. This is most dramatically seen in the erosion of the dedicated agency
distribution channel. For many U.S. insurers, bank branch distribution is fast becoming the
predominant channel for the sale of life annuity products.
9

At the same time, banks have experienced a steady decline in their role as capital
providers to corporate customers. Bank alternatives such as GE Capital compete for traditional
bank business but are not subject to the same regulation and implicit tax burdens. Corporate
clients from AAA to high yield go to the capital markets directly with much ease and less expense
than previously. Disintermediation has been more general, and many services which the house
bank once routinely provided - and some new ones - are now regularly pitched by new potential
providers trawling for customers. Providers know more about potential clients and the clients’
Chief Financial Officers, aided by monitors on their desks, know more about the alternatives.
There are generally decreasing informational asymmetries.
The counter-examples here prove the point. Factoring, i.e., bill discounting is an example
of a corporate banking line of business which is not changing much and continues to be very
profitable. But this is a business in which successful players need to know both sides and market
conditions, i.e., one in which incumbents have relatively stubborn informational asymmetries
relative to potential entrants. It is small and not growing much. This reality recently led the Bank
of New York to exit a profitable but stagnant niche looking for greater growth potential.
In security sales and services, we have already noted the changing nature of the
underwriting business. Funds management has become commodified. Merchant banking as an
activity pursued by stand-alone companies has essentially ceased to exist, though many of its
functions are now carried out by divisions of large banks (among others). In all of these cases,
relationships and information asymmetries are less important than they were. Charles Schwab’s
“One-Source” and other fund supermarkets have unalterably changed the value proposition of
proprietary fund families. Hedge funds and venture capital partnerships provide many of the
advantages of the old style merchant bank with much greater liquidity and possibility for
diversification.
Here, on the other hand, there are some counter-examples of substantially growing
significance. Payments processing (retail) and clearing and settlement (wholesale) are scaleintensive. These businesses are quite profitable with attractive returns on invested capital. The
same is true of the somewhat more complex custody business. Minimum efficient scale is thus
still important in some lines of business. These are seeing global consolidation and conceivably a
growing market. This is a competitive situation with path dependencies of its own as best
illustrated by the trajectories of State Street mentioned earlier and the Bank of New York.
In the great majority of these cases, however, the old barriers are decaying and so are the
old franchises. New opportunities, many driven by developments in information technology and
the possibilities they represent are rising. But seizing them is not a passive activity. It requires
commitment and therefore, in a changing and therefore uncertain world, risk.
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3. New Perspectives on Risk
If operating environments change in significant ways, then the emerging conditions must
pose different sets of opportunities and risks from their predecessors. Profit requires
commitment, but in this new world commitment affects risk profiles in ways which, because of
the incompleteness of markets, cannot be hedged away. Thus simply having a strategy raises
questions of risk management. The evolution of financial institutions’ thinking about risk has
generally not recognized this, but the ongoing changes in technology and markets are pushing
many towards seeing it. They should: the implications for strategy assessment and action are in
fact radical.
Many decisions routinely being grappled with by industry firms today are strategic in
nature. As a practical matter, all decisions to enter new lines of business are. Decisions to offer
new products may be. Sometimes the sunk costs involved in this are very small but often they are
not. Expenses which seem recoverable at a time when many firms are contemplating a particular
move can be much less valued when a firm which has taken the plunge and regretted it wants to
get out. Setting up business in new places almost always involves sunk costs unless it is simply a
matter of following established clients: the incoming firm needs to make connections and
generally invest in information it will not generally be able to recoup in a sale to another provider.
Much the same is usually true of investing in new consumers. In some sense, the acquisition of
large consumer banking franchises can be seen as an investment in new retail customers, with
sunk costs often including high premiums to book that must be earned back to generate an
economic return.
The risks involved in making such decisions have not generally been considered by
investing firms. This becomes clear when one considers the evolution of financial institutions’
thinking about risk. To do this, however, one must begin with a general definition of risk. It is
helpful to think of it as any source of uncertainty about the future operating environment which
can (in particular, negatively) affect profits.
Specific types of risk correspond to categories of sources. The broad general categories
are financial risk, operating risk and, we will argue, strategic risk. To understand why there is a
third category and not just the first two, it is helpful to see how these concerns emerged.
There are many different types of financial risk. Credit risk is the risk borrowers will not
repay their loans. Liquidity risk is the risk that lenders will want to withdraw more money than is
available in quick assets. Interest rate risk is the risk that adverse interest rate movements will
decrease the value of or income flow from interest-bearing investments. Market risk is the risk
that adverse movements in asset prices will lower the mark-to-market value of the trading
portfolio.
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The origins of concerns about financial risk are partly private and partly regulatory in
origin. The private element arises from banking involving risky investments of deposits.
Furthermore, the deposits are generally more liquid than the investments. All this adds to the
danger that the value of the equity of the firm will be at some moment zero or negative. The
regulatory element arises from the fact that banks run an important part of the payments system:
bank deposits are in effect a part of the medium of exchange. Governments have an interest in
preventing abrupt changes in volume. They therefore have an interest, and generally a more
conservative one, in managing the level of financial risk.
These are all risks of individual transactions. Different sorts of risk arise from the fact that
the organization itself undertakes many transactions. These are collectively known as operational
risk. Two types are most salient. The first derives from the malfunctioning of processing
systems. This could take many forms, among them recording mistakes, lack of reference data,
processing delays, and general system crashes. Internal malfeasance is also a species of operating
risk. Inadequately monitored individuals acting on their own account rather than the firm’s, or
taking on more risk than instructed in hopes of superior reward, are potentially major problems as
well.
Operational risk has only recently become the matter of focus for senior managers. The
origins of this interest lie in part in increasing complexity of systems leading to increased
vulnerability. Deregulation and market volatility leading to increased risk-taking, are probably
also a cause.
Features of operating environments over the past decade have made plain that there is
more to risk than investments and systems. We call the category which has emerged strategic
risk. If strategy concerns decisions which are hard subsequently to implement quickly and to
reverse, strategic risk concerns the consequences when the environments in which those relatively
inflexible commitments decisions play out in unattractive or even adverse ways. Sunk costs play
a crucial role in strategic risk – with no sunkness, the commitments can be costlessly unwound.
(There is always, of course, also the opportunity cost.)
Concern about this is not a fad. Rather, like the species of risks and risk management
which have preceded it, it is a larger form of risk in which the previously known ones are
embedded. Choosing a product line, business area or even a location is the key strategic decision.
Inherent are risks that follow from the chosen path; ones that must be managed in the rather
standardized ways that have developed over the last decade. However, it is the strategic choice
that is crucial and the determinant of what risks are present and therefore which risks need to be
managed. The analogy to owning a house atop a dormant earthquake fault line is almost exact.
Its location is the key aspect of its risk, not just its home security system. The origins of concern
about strategic risk lie in modes of competition, which were always possible but now have
become undeniably salient.
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The source of these changes in strategic environment is not, unlike its predecessors,
principally regulatory. Rather, it is some combination of underlying technology and demand
factors. Information technology has been a tremendous driver of the possibilities of new products
and the ease of their creation. Some work, some don’t. The apparent early success of internet
banking in Scandinavia versus the limited adaptation of “smart cards” in the U.S., despite
significant investments, shows that it is the competitive environment, and customer acceptance
today, rather than regulation that produces change and leads to greater strategic risk.
There is also an argument that the world consuming population has been getting wealthy
disproportionately fast in recent years and the demand for financial service products fancy and
plain has been on the rise. This has led to differentiated strategies to service a growing and
increasingly segmentable clientele. The use of local bank private banking, e.g., PNC Advisors,
niche players, e.g., Bessemer, or broad new strategies, e.g., Schwab – U.S. Trust are examples of
three clearly different strategies all aimed as segments of what was once more simply described as
the affluent market.
With the recognition of the existence of strategic risk comes the need for strategic risk
assessment. Even in the old world of essentially static equilibrium, strategic commitment induces
operating and financial risk profiles which cannot effectively be hedged. The consequences of a
strategy thus include the changes in other sorts of risk-bearing which following that strategy will
impose, and the calculus of costs and benefits of the strategy must include the induced risk
burden.
In punctuated equilibrium and continuous change worlds, matters are more complex still.
In addition to this induced risk bearing, there is also the risk of the commitment itself and the
opportunity costs it bears. The recent decision of First Union to close the Money Store only two
years after acquisition is a case in point. However, it should be remembered that strategic risk
follows from not following a proposed path, as well. As subsequent waves of change follow from
the last, the firms’ capability tomorrow may be dependent upon decisions today, e.g., early
commitments to PC-banking provided the foundation for eventually rolling out far more robust
web-banking offerings.
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4. Organization and Strategic Risk Management
These concerns are structural rather than ad hoc. Circumstances are such that they are
important now. The environment which makes them important may or may not last forever; but it
seems certain to last for an extended period. Ignoring them or treating them with a wave of the
hand (as in the commonest response of an arbitrary increase in the hurdle rate in project
evaluation) is therefore not responsible.
The concerns need to be addressed systematically at an organizational level. The actual
processes for making strategic decisions needs to reflect their seriousness. The structures
governing such decision-making need to change to support the new processes. Corporate culture
needs to change in ways which reflect the demands these will place on employees.
The process by which such decisions are generally made routinely underestimate the value
of strategic investments and make it difficult to for organizations to see, and get used to, the
means of managing the risks. The conventional routine of project evaluation by discounted cash
flow analysis and, more broadly, so-called strategic planning involving revenue and cost forecasts
five and ten years out in which flows are treated as fixed and new information as unimportant, is
now highly problematic. The problem is not mainly that the precision is implausible, though this
is so, but rather that the particular cash flow expected in the future is portrayed as the only
attractive feature the future has. It is a striking fact that no one at all reflective thinks about their
own life in this fashion.
The traditional general approach causes prospective projects to seem less attractive than
they should, some initiated projects to be less valuable than they should, and many initiated
projects to be managed in ways which impose unnecessary risk and fail to maximize shareholder
value. These are not desirable features in themselves, and their cumulative effects on companies
in a rapidly changing and increasingly closely monitored environment are worse. Implementing
alternatives in a world of change is not a trivial matter, but it is an important one.
Several typical organizational features of the old approaches are themselves highly
problematic. The most salient here is the silo mentality. A silo structure of responsibilities may
well be the most efficient execution of agreed upon tasks. But embedding strategic planning and
strategic risk assessment within silos is a recipe for superficial assessment of possibilities and
opportunities. It leads to what might be called an infrastructure of continuity, in which decisionmakers who are focused on established customers and products and on established means of
addressing them, are asked to evaluate enterprises which may threaten and even cannibalize these.
This is not the way to create imaginative scanning and flexible implementation. For years, many
U.S. banks were frustrated in their development of mutual fund products in their investment
divisions as the retail branch “silo” registered concern over the potential cannibalization of their
consumer deposit base. Similarly, institutions who ignore the potential impact of the internet and
e-commerce on their broad business models, run the risk of missed opportunities or worse, the
loss of business franchises.
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Financial options represent a thought-provoking analogy to the traditional decisionmaking model. The financial option is a contract in which, for a period after agreement, the buyer
can choose to carry out activities-in particular buying or selling ownership claims-at the
precommitted price or decide not to do so depending upon the market conditions which
subsequently obtain. The analogue of interest is a real option, real because the activity the buyer
would undertake is directly productive-to run a new product or line of business-rather than a mere
transfer of ownership.
Options are valuable because they offer flexibility. The flexibility is valuable for two
distinct reasons. One is the opportunity they offer for exploiting the upside of less than fully
anticipated emerging circumstances. A second is the opportunity for limiting the downside by
shutting down the cost flows of capabilities which come to look unpromising enough.
The operational implementation of a real options approach to strategic investment is a
highly nontrivial matter in organization as well as detail. There are three basic elements which
need to be considered. The first concerns recognition. The second concerns the creation and
structuring of real options. Only the third concerns actual valuation.
Recognizing real options requires first of all assessing future decisions as if they will be
made on the basis of future, and not just present, information. This says that decision-makers
must value flexibility and potentially productive intangibles, and not simply confine their analysis
to tangible expected revenues and costs. This, in turn, requires far more searching surveillance of
possible paths of evolution, for it is only in the context of concrete circumstances that the
potential value of present intangibles can be assessed. This leads to another counterintuitive
thought: ex ante uncertainly can be a positive feature of a decision-making environment,
representing value-increasing opportunity and not value-diminishing risk as in traditional finance.
This is the essence of the real option perspective. The value of any option increases with risk,
rather than decreases. Inducing decision-makers to act on the basis of this is no small matter.
Creating and structuring real options develops the surveillance element in a constructive
mode. It involves expanding the consideration set of possible actions. There are often many
ways in which a project which was initially conceived in a unitary way can be decomposed and
put into steps and sections with distinct decision nodes and assessment opportunities, and
opportunities for further phasing, between them. It is often possible to build the timing of
revenue and cost flows into this in a way which allows the management of risk. Collateral actions
in (emerging) favorable environments can be optimized. Exit alternatives can be protected and
actively used for risk management. The injunction here is simple: Unbundle decisions! While
criticized in some quarters for their slowness in embracing the internet, Merrill Lynch’s more
cautious, step-by-step, implementation strategy may be seen in this light. As pieces of their
transformation away from exclusive dependence on the broker channel emerge, results can be
evaluated and corrective actions taken to limit risk and seek new opportunities.
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These measures are useful, and promote better decision-making, in themselves. They are,
however, incomplete: the final step of actual valuation remains. There are several alternative
approaches to this. Variants of the standard finance option-pricing approach, know as BlackScholes analysis, are the most familiar of these. The strength of the assumptions required in
taking this for an exact analysis are well known and the more awkward the more idiosyncratic the
risk. However, such calculations do shed useful light. So do Monte Carlo decision-tree analyses,
where possibilities can be assigned to possible outcomes. For less certain environments, as in the
internet world, scenario planning offers a methodology to where future outcomes can be
evaluated.
Beyond implementation for specific possible projects, the strategic perspective on option
sensitive decision making suggests activities. It suggests, in particular, developing and sustaining
new potential sources of competitive advantage, dynamic analogues to static barriers to entry
discussed above. One vivid example is facility in product innovation. A second lies in the
informational aspects of specific relationships. A third is organizational flexibility.
Financial services institutions may have (or develop) an unusual facility in product
innovation. Most aspects of new product development are, as we remarked above, relatively easy
to imitate. But some are not. The potential advantage lies in two component parts. The first is
the organizational ability to create new products. The second is the market presence to sell them.
Unique capability in either (or both) is valuable. Much of the success of Fidelity Investments, for
example, can be attributed to their demonstrated facility for the creation of ever-changing variants
of mutual fund offerings.
Established relationships with customers whose needs are evolving may offer asymmetric
favorable opportunities. Knowledge of customers’ business may give established providers who
are sufficiently alert a clear head start on recognizing emerging needs and on developing
solutions. So may knowledge of customers’ infrastructure and systems. In a world of constant
challenge, ideas for constructive change, and the opportunity to present them in a timely fashion,
are extremely valuable. In this, relationships may matter more rather than less, both for inspiring
new ideas and for selling them. When done well, it is precisely this feature of customer and
market knowledge that drives the broader product offering of the U.S. banks and provides hope
for the scope economy alluded to above.
Finally, organizational flexibility can in itself present a potential sustainable advantage.
This is because most financial services are, the occasional rhetoric to the contrary
notwithstanding, not very flexible. Two sorts of flexibility are relevant here. One is adding new
activities to the extant core. The other is subtracting them. The organization’s ability to
transform itself in response to a changing environment, therefore, offers another sustainable
barrier. The then bold decision by Bankers Trust in the 1980s to shed its retail banking franchise
and transform itself into corporate investment banking was a striking example of organizational
restructuring by subtraction. On the other hand, Mellon Bank’s decision some years later to
dramatically add to their investment management business through the purchase of Dreyfus and
the Boston Company put the firm on a new strategic business trajectory.
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This raises the deep questions of organizational architecture and process, since exploiting
(or developing) any of these may require organizational innovation. These questions come in two
main families. The first asks what changes are required to support such sources of competitive
advantage. The second asks what is needed to create enduring change.
Changes in routines are required to support the development of such sources of
competitive advantage. These concern discovery and assessment, nurturance, risk-management
practices and strategic decision-making, and exit.
Firms must become systematically good at discovering and assessing unfamiliar
opportunities. Part of the problem with discovery in a traditionally organized firm is that the
clues are often encountered at relatively low levels of the organization whereas the decisions are
usually made at relatively high ones. In such cases, information needs to flow more freely - a
broader circle of individuals than is traditional may need to be drawn in some way into the
decision-making. Assessing opportunities reliably before any concrete models exist is always a
particularly difficult task; but in environments such as these, this may not be the best way to look
at the problem. The overall discovery task might best be thought of as one of generating choices
about which enough is known to make an informed decision. It may be that the important first
task is fleshing out an idea into an experiment rather than making an early decisive call. The
“smart card” tests during the Atlanta summer Olympics is an example of in increasingly common
trend of introducing new product innovations into limited and controllable environments.
If ideas are really worth exploring, organizations must nurture them. This sounds
straightforward but in practice is anything but. Many new initiatives within an organization
threaten some established interests elsewhere in the organization. Some represent sufficiently
different ways of understanding opportunities or doing business that employees find it part to feel
part of both the initiative and the firm. (The commonest response to this is to pursue the initiative
without changing behavior enough to make the initiative work.) And some new initiatives will
simply puzzle the customers if too closely identified with the firm. Structural changes to the
organization or ad hoc task forces may be necessary to carry out this stage effectively. All of this
is particularly salient in organizations for which it is particularly important to inspire customers’
confidence and trust. The establishment of separately branded web-banking offers such as Bank
One’s Wingspan.com may be seen at least partially in this light.
The track record of so-called corporate intrapreneurship is not in fact good. Profitability is
generally low and failure not uncommon. A common conclusion of arms-length studies is that
fewer ventures and more commitment would be better. The commitment in question is a subtle
thing. Pressures from the parent inhibiting altering venture strategies as new opportunities
become clear and circumstances evolve are nontrivial. The motivations and skills of the new
venture executives, and the incentives facing them, are often not what they might be. And, culture
conflicts are difficult to resolve. This had been the story surrounding the attempts to merge
investment and commercial banking, as the case of Morgan Grenfell and Deutsche Bank or more
recently, Bank of America and Montgomery Securities.
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There are other alternatives. External alliances may be necessary, in the sense that certain
business opportunities may not be open in a timely fashion to either of two firms without their
cooperating. But the dangers of strictly external alliances are by this time well known. Joint
activities generate competitively valuable information and human capital. These may well make
the alliance partner a more formidable unallied competititor in the future. This is at least one of
the reasons given for the failed Integrion internet venture. Alliances often generate subsequent
advantage unequally while at the same time lulling the partner whose relative position is
weakening with the thought that they are now active. It is as difficult as it is important to make
sure you learn and retain as much as your partner does and that you are as well situated if and
when the alliance comes apart. And even when they work well, alliances often require unusual
degrees of managerial attention. So aside from situations of extreme opportunity and
complementarity, strictly external alliances should be regarded quite cautiously.
In the less extreme circumstances characteristic of nascent possibilities, external ventures
owned by the firm and, to a significant extent, by the venture managers are an attractive
alternative. They do not have the dangers of strictly external alliances. They avoid the dangers of
internal politics. They permit incentive schemes for senior employees which would be politically
difficult within an established organization. And they leave unambiguous who has the property
rights in work products which would be valuable for the parent organization. However, if the
product is focused at existing customers this causes other competitive problems?
This view should lead to a wholesale review of risk management within the dynamic firm.
Conventional risk management, both financial and operational, is of course complicated by
initiatives which the firm does not entirely understand. The fact that the initiatives generally start
small is a saving grace, as is the fact that the reason for starting the initiative will generally be
susceptible to the sort of structural analysis suggested above. This is only to say that a capability
most banks do not now really possess - or at least use on a routine basis - will become even more
important.
One structural means of addressing this is to change the composition of the voices at the
table for strategic decision-making. It seems clearly important in a business fundamentally about
managing risk to have all aspects of the risk perspective represented in such discussions. The
background, experiences, and responsibilities of most divisional Chief Risk Officers at present
would not help them make the constructive contribution required, but it is clear by example that
some corporate Chief Risk Officers would be able to do so, and it is clearer still that there are
executives with different backgrounds who could take on this portfolio and add value by doing so.
In short, this view of strategic risk requires the development and use of a corporate level risk
officer engaged in strategic debate on future activities and business lines. Risk management is
too important to the process to be brought in “after the fact” and their perspective too relevant to
be kept quiet.
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Finally, firms must, as suggested above, become good at graceful exit. This is so partly
because in a world of change, even the good opportunities will not persist forever. It is also true
because many promising opportunities will not, for one reason or another, pan out. There are
many forces in most organizations working against flexibility in such matters, from training
requirements and the career concerns of employees and executives to ill-founded notions of what
important customers do and ought to value. Getting good at graceful exit probably requires a
substantial amount of culture change as well as restructuring of institutions. Here again
investment banks have traditionally been more successful.
The ideas of the preceding paragraph suggest a surprising afterthought. Banks are
generally identified as relatively conservative institutions. Yet the thrust of the paragraph–and
indeed of the past nine–is that banks will do better in the world in which they seem to be moving
if they behave more like venture capitalists. Venture capitalists do not expect each new
investment to be a success–indeed, they expect most ultimately to fail. They do not know, at the
outset, which the survivors will be. They try to organize both incentives and the resources of their
own organizations to help (some) survivors emerge and to see to it that they own a piece of the
survivors which have good futures. This is a very different model from the static barriers to entry
for thinking about choosing lines of business. But it does have a theoretical foundation which
seems to suit the times.
The challenge here lies less in creating prototypes which demonstrate a possibility than it
is in creating enduring change, be it in the prototype grown into production or in the parent.
Given proper incentives in the prototype, this problem will take care of itself. The process is most
worthwhile when there is something of the prototype that can be folded back or otherwise
imported into the parent organization. This inevitably involves change. For change to be
effective and long-lasting, the organization needs to be prepared to want it and become competent
to implement it. Neither of these is straightforward; and both require real leadership.
Behind all of this, it must be increasingly obvious, lies the company’s culture. Strategic
risk ultimately has two elements. One is doing the right thing (at the right time). But the other, at
least as important, is doing it well. Thus the importance of corporate culture, structural issues
entirely aside. (Thus also the importance of vertical engagement, idea-finding mechanisms
entirely aside.)
For in a static world, full optimization of plans is imaginable and strategy is matter for
deduction from a relatively limited fact base. Actions can be taken ex ante which will prove
enduringly wise. In a world of change, the future and its possibilities are initially obscure. There
is an inevitable inductive element to any valuable analysis. A planner’s emphasis in such a world
should be on diversification, experimentation, and getting (and contemplating searchingly)
feedback before any decisive action-in short, or learning. Procedures, institutions, and a set of
understandings as to what the firm needs if its employees are to prosper should all be designed to
support this.
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5. The Research Behind this Study
The principal investigator in this study was Daniel Raff, Associate Professor of
Management at the Wharton School and Senior Fellow of the Wharton Financial Institutions
Center. He had much insightful assistance from three partners in the Deloitte Global Financial
Services practice, Frank Kolhatkar, Leon Bloom, and Robert Carter. Anthony Santomero, the
Richard King Mellon Professor of Finance at Wharton and Director of the Financial Institutions
Center, and Sidney Winter, the Deloitte and Touche Professor of Management, were heavily
involved in the early analysis and fieldwork. Peter Burns, Managing Director of the Center,
Daniel Levinthal, Julian Aresty Professor of Management, and Adrian Tschoegl, Assistant
Professor of Management, gave helpful comments.
The principal field work involved extended interviews with senior officials at Citigroup,
Chase, Bankers Trust (as it was then), the Bank of New York, the Bank of Montreal, HSBC (in
the London headquarters), Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, UBS, Banco Santander Central
Hispano (BSCH), and the Singapore Development Bank. Mr. Pei Chia was also very gracious
with his time. Interviews at Allianz and the Bank of England were also helpful, as were formal
responses by Messers. George Vojta and Michael Urkowitz and lively general discussion at a
board meeting of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center in New York in May, 2000.
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